

D/LA

~~SECRET~~

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

9 November 1950

Assistant Director, O/RE

Suspension of Publication of CIA/RE 30-50

1. The withholding of CIA/RE 30-50, Effects of Probable Argentine Economic Practice on US Security Interests, from publication and dissemination seems to have important implications for CIA's functions and for the capabilities of US intelligence as a whole.
2. The attached chronology shows that usual procedures were followed in the production of this paper. O/RE did not begin writing until OIR indicated they were not in a position themselves to do the necessary research for the paper. All objections raised in two inter-agency meetings were met to the satisfaction of the representatives attending, including those from OIR. The intelligence agencies of the military departments have concurred. In addition, informal conversations held with authorized contacts in the Eximbank indicate that that institution considers the paper sound and that the views of the Federal Reserve Bank support it. A similar paper, Probable Argentine Policy toward the United States in 1952 and its Effects on US Interests, was published as CIA/RE 50-48 (OIR 50-48), 15 February 1949, with the concurrence of the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
3. Apparently, objections to the paper by the Department of State are on grounds other than the opinion of its own intelligence organization as to accuracy of data and logic of conclusions. There is reason to believe that OIR would, if acting independently, have concurred with the paper; and it seems probable that, if OIR were overruled by other units of State on data and logic, a dissent would have been filed. Possibly State objects to one of the two main conclusions of the CIA paper -- that the Argentine government over the longer term may resume practices contrary to US policy objectives -- on the grounds that CIA should not imply that a US policy may not accomplish all that its proponents claim for it or hope from it.
4. I consider this matter important for its bearing both on CIA functions and on the independence of intelligence functions in general. I believe that, if CIA withdraws from analysis of probable developments resulting from or occurring in spite of existing and possible US policies, a presently important part of CIA's work will disappear. Even more important, if those responsible for policies prevent any independent estimation of probable developments bearing on the success of those policies,

the capabilities of US intelligence as a whole will, in my opinion, be seriously impaired.

5. It is recommended that CIA/RE 30-50 be published in its present form, with or without comment from CIR.

THEODORE HARRITT

Attachment

AD/RE:TB: ucl

Distribution

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2 - AD/RE ✓  
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